During the nineteen eighties and early nineties, the British public became aware of a series of miscarriages of justice that resulted, mainly or partly, from faulty or dishonest forensic science practice. Consequently, the reputation of forensic science, until then regarded as a profession with the highest integrity, began to decline. News of cases such as those of John Preece, convicted on the testimony of a forensic scientist who knowingly withheld part of the evidence, and of Judith Ward, convicted on the basis of unreliable scientific techniques, shook public confidence in the system. Cases like those of the 'Birmingham Six', the 'Guildford Four', the 'Maguire Seven' - all these cases involved alleged terrorist offences - and Stefan Kiszko, who was accused of murdering a child, became familiar in most households.

As a consequence of this widespread concern, two inquiries were held into the state of British forensic science. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and the House of Lords Select Committee on Science & Technology both produced their final reports in 1993. The general conclusions were that, although forensic science had gone through a bad patch in recent years and that further improvements could be made, it had now largely set its house in order.

After the appearance of these reports, new revelations about poor forensic practice came to public notice. The discovery that equipment at the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment was contaminated and that forensic tests from that laboratory may have led to up to twelve miscarriages of justice in cases of terrorism caused public disquiet. Stories of incompetent forensic work, such as in the case of Carl Bridgewater, the murdered newspaper boy, added to the sense of unease. Although these cases dated from earlier years, the realisation that there were further skeletons in the forensic cupboard generated new concern. Nevertheless, the general belief was that the problems, by and large, had been resolved.

Unfortunately, this is not true. The public debate about forensic science has been concerned mainly with individual cases of miscarriage of justice, not with the system that allows such injustice to occur in the first place and with such frequency. It is this latter problem that I wish to address.

In fact, there are several interrelated problems, which, in combination, produce a system that invites malpractice. Before explaining what these problems are, it is necessary first to recount some facts about the way forensic science provision is organised in Britain.

It may appear incredible to many people that forensic science is a concept that is not recognised under the Law. Anyone may claim to be a forensic scientist and to practise as one, if they wish. No qualifications or credentials of any sort are required. This situation is akin to the notion that anyone can claim to be a doctor and be able to treat patients and carry out surgical operations, without any kind of medical training or degree, a notion most people would find ridiculous. In the forensic world, only a forensic pathologist (or medic) is required by the Law to be properly qualified. In any other field, from toxicology to DNA fingerprinting, from ballistics to document examination, from blood analysis to glass fragment identification, anyone may practise. The system is totally unregulated.

In the years before 1989 the Forensic Science Service (FSS) formed an integral part of the Police Department of the Home Office. In those days Police Forces submitted their cases to the FSS and the work was carried out without payment of a fee. However, Police Forces did pay an annual sum of money to the service, but the amount was fixed according to the size of the Force and not to the amount of forensic work carried out.

In 1989, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee recommended that agency status be given to the FSS. Its advice was accepted and the service was, effectively, privatised. This meant that the police were now obliged to pay the full cost of forensic work on a case-by-case basis. However, one member of the Committee dissented from the general view, stating in an amendment to the draft report that the market-place approach to forensic science was inappropriate, but this view did not prevail. So, the FSS was thrown into the market-place, there to compete with the many independent commercial laboratories that exist. Many of these commercial laboratories have high standards, but, regrettably, too many do not. The FSS has been forced to compete with these practitioners.

Let us now consider what happens when forensic advice is required by either side in a criminal trial. A forensic scientist is normally consulted by either a police officer or a solicitor, but only very rarely directly by a barrister. A police officer will often, but by no means always, already have a 'case', by which I mean a belief in a certain course of events and in the guilt of a particular individual, before he consults a scientist. A solicitor or a barrister will always have such a case prior to approaching a consultant.

Inevitably, therefore, the forensic scientist is very often presented with a 'line' that he is required to support. If he does not support the case presented to him, it is generally true to say that he will not be in good odour with those who consulted him. In practice, the reputation of the forensic scientist rests on whether or not he has rendered good service to those who paid him.

Those who argue that any 'product' is best evaluated by the customer have applied this argument to forensic science. It is a point of view that is superficially plausible, because it makes sense in other walks of life. If one buys a pound of potatoes from a grocer or pays a picture-framer to frame a painting, one has a right to comment on the reliability of the person involved if the cabbage is rotten or the frame falls to pieces. One would be perfectly entitled to go to another grocer or picture-framer next time.

This situation is not analogous to forensic science provision, because the work carried out by the forensic specialist will affect people other than the customer (the lawyer or police officer). The consequences of incompetent or dishonest forensic practice do not affect the customer alone, but other people who have not had any say in the choice of the forensic scientist. If the customer were, for example, an unscrupulous solicitor, he may benefit from the work of a so-called expert, even if the latter's work harms others, because the 'expert' will have helped him to win his case and make money. What is good for the individual solicitor is not necessarily good for justice. Therefore, the belief that forensic science is a commodity to be evaluated only by those who pay for it, just like any other commodity, is without foundation. It is astonishing that such an opinion was ever expressed. The standards of forensic scientists are judged by interested, but not disinterested, parties.

Court procedure in Britain follows the adversarial system, in which one barrister argues the case against the accused and the other argues the case for his innocence. This system has been criticised on the grounds that it seems unethical to try to defend someone whom the Defence barrister might believe to be guilty, or to prosecute someone whom the Prosecution barrister might believe to be innocent. However, this is to misunderstand the logic of the system. A Defence barrister does not necessarily believe that his client, if be believes him to be guilty, should be acquitted. This perception arises because of the general view that barristers 'fight' cases and 'win' or 'lose' them. These are terms of adversarial combat and they give a false impression of the purpose of a trial. Most conscientious barristers do not see a trial in those terms at all. Rather, they see it as their duty to argue the case, for or against the accused as the case may be, as lucidly and as honestly as possible. If two first-rate minds argued the evidence for and against the accused to the best of their ability, the real significance of the evidence will be bound to become clear to the jury. In the words of Sir Eric Hallinan, one time Chief Justice of the Windward and Leeward Islands (the italics are his):

It is the duty of the prosecutor to present the evidence for the Crown as cogently and at the same time as fairly as possible. It is not the function or duty of a prosecutor to try and obtain a conviction by every means in his power or to make the case appear stronger than it is. On the other hand he must lead the evidence for the Crown even though he may consider it weak; he must leave it to the jury to assess its value . . . [The barrister] is not 'out to win' . . . At the end of a criminal trial where I was prosecutor, I never felt that the Crown had 'lost' its case, if the accused person was acquitted. If the Crown's case had been cogently and fairly presented, then I was satisfied - whatever the outcome.

Regrettably, not all trials are conducted in this noble spirit. In many trials barristers are certainly 'out to win' and it is under such circumstances that miscarriages of justice are liable to occur. Evidence, including scientific evidence, can be manipulated in such a way as to make it appear stronger or weaker than it really is. This happens much more frequently than is generally realised.

What, then, are the consequences of all this? We have a system in which many unscrupulous, incompetent and unqualified people are allowed to appear as scientific witnesses in criminal courts. The system requires such people to appear on behalf of one 'side' or the other and are paid to do so. If they satisfy their side, they will be consulted again; if they do not, they are very unlikely to be consulted on future occasions. If they are not consulted, they will lose their livelihood. It is neither the adversarial system nor the payment of fees that is the problem; it is the marriage of both that produces the explosive mixture.

In a situation such as this malpractice is bound to occur. Indeed, it occurs very frequently. This is not hyperbole. Nevertheless, it may, perfectly reasonably, be asked 'What is the evidence that supports this assertion?' Unfortunately, by the very nature of the problem, there are no official facts and figures that can be marshalled in support of my contention. This does not mean that the evidence does not exist - it simply means that the evidence is of such a kind that it cannot be discussed publicly without specifying individual cases and individual forensic scientists. Such a course of action would be both legally and morally questionable; in any case, my concern is to address the issues, not to attack individuals.

During my twenty-one years of practising as a forensic scientist, I have seen many cases in which both incompetent and dishonest forensic evidence was presented. It is far more difficult to deal with such malpractice than may be supposed. The problem appears to be getting worse, with the increased financial pressures on many forensic scientists. Also, with the effective privatisation of the FSS, the police are now often forced to go to other, cheaper, practitioners, who are able to undercut the FSS and other reputable forensic scientists.

The result is, quite often, utter confusion in the court-room. Juries are quite unable to discern the truth, when two so-called experts contradict one another in the court-room. There are practitioners who exist solely for the purpose of muddying the waters in court, a fact well-known within forensic circles, but rarely, if ever, publicly discussed. These practitioners are able to exist and make a living precisely because they are willing to undermine sound scientific evidence in court. Their lack of qualifications is not seen as a disadvantage by those who consult them; at the same time their willingness to bend the truth is seen as an asset. Indeed, they are consulted precisely because they are willing to do this. When faced with a fundamental disagreement between two so-called scientists, what are members of the jury to conclude? I imagine that they would feel that, if the experts cannot agree, they themselves could not be expected to assess the evidence. The result is probably that the evidence will be ignored altogether.

I have encountered practitioners who have no understanding of the most basic scientific principles and have heard several say in court things that are quite impossible to be true, in the sense that they contravene everything that is known about the laws of nature. I have known lawyers and police officers who will try to coerce their consultants to support their opinions, in the teeth of the evidence. I have known cases where police officers have 'lost' evidence, and, indeed, cases where 'evidence' has miraculously been found. I have known cases where officers have asked forensic scientists to destroy evidence. I have even known cases in which solicitors have, quite brazenly, asked a consultant to make up evidence. Let no-one underestimate the scale of the problem.

What, then, can be done? The House of Lords Select Committee made one very good proposal; its Report recommended that an independent Forensic Science Research Centre be established. Such a Centre could fulfil the role of arbiter in forensic science matters. In the words of the Report (Para. 2.48):

In the event of further proceedings along the lines of the recent consideration by the Court of Appeal of the cases of the Birmingham six, the Maguire seven and Miss Judith Ward, such a centre might provide Ministers and the courts with a source of scientific advice which could be seen to be wholly independent.

It was envisaged that such an independent Centre would be based at a university. Attempts were made to implement this proposal in at least two universities, but, due mainly to the Government's refusal to provide even the most basic financial support, as well as the reluctance of the universities themselves to provide the necessary funds, both attempts failed. Also, the Royal Commission set up to enquire into the miscarriages of justice recommended the establishment of an independent Forensic Science Advisory Council, with a remit to monitor forensic science laboratories and to ensure the maintenance of the highest standards of practice. This proposal, too, was not carried out, in spite of repeated calls for its implementation.

In one important respect the Select Committee made what I believe to be a great error of judgement. In considering the state of British forensic science, it made it clear that it would not include within its remit any discussion of the market-place approach nor of the new agency status of the FSS, in spite of the fact that these issues are fundamental to the understanding of the problem.

The House of Lords' Report also recommended a system of accreditation for forensic scientists. Unfortunately, nothing has yet come of this recommendation. However, early this year, the report of the Working Group on Forensic Science recommended the establishment of a Registration Council, whose remit would be to produce a Register of reputable forensic scientists. Full details for its implementation were given in the report. I welcome this proposal, but I am only too aware that it can only address half the problem. Bad forensic practitioners can be either incompetent or dishonest or both. A Register may well succeed in weeding out the incompetent ones, but it cannot do the same with the dishonest ones, since it is much easier to establish whether someone is competent or not, than to establish whether they are honest or not. It must be remembered that competent scientists are not necessarily honest.

I believe that three reforms are needed to save British forensic science. First, the use of forensic science as a tool, which the opposing sides in a trial use to win a case, should be abandoned, even though the game has now acquired the hallowed nature of a tradition. The forensic scientist should not be answerable to either side in a case. He should be answerable to - by which I mean, paid by - the court (i.e. the judge) alone. Such an arrangement would remove the temptation to please one side or the other. The judge is a participant in the adversarial system, but he is neutral - he is interested, but disinterested.

My second proposal is that a fully-staffed statutory body of forensic science should be established. This body would be answerable solely to the judiciary. The easiest way to achieve this would be to place the FSS under the control of the judiciary. The police and either side in the adversarial process should be free to consult it, but there would be no pressure on its staff to accommodate the wishes of one side or the other for reasons of monetary gain or misplaced loyalty.

Finally, the wholly unregulated nature of forensic science should come to an end. Proper university qualifications should be instituted. The notion that any unqualified person should be free to interfere with the processes of justice and be rewarded financially for doing so must be discarded.

The very raison d'etre of forensic science is solely to serve justice. The developments of recent years have shown that the existence of undesirable pressures have led many practitioners away from this path. I trust that those who have the power to right this wrong will see the need for urgent action.

* Dr. Zakaria Erzinclioglu was a researcher at Cambridge University and is writing a book, The Narrow Edge of Truth, about evidence and reason in public life.